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Abstract
Migration, Fixed Costs, and Location-Speciflc Amenities:
A Hazard Rate Analysis
by
Wallace E. Hufi&nan
and
Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan
This paper presents a model of long-distance migration for a finite-life individual who
consumes leisure, purchased goods, and local amenities and incurs significant fixed costs of
movmg and empirical results fi^om a hazard rateanalysis of residence spells/internal migration
using data onadult males inthePanel of Income Dynamics Study over a 20-year period. The
migration hazard for interstate moves is concave in residence duration, withthe hazard of
migration peaking at six years in residence. The hazard ofmigrations is quite sensitive to the wage
difference between home and host locations, but variables that proxy fixed costs of internal
migration, e.g., having less education, being married, having children in school, being self-
employed ora union member, sigmficantly lower the hazard ofinternal migration and increase
duration at the home location ororigin. An increase in the crime rate at the home/origin increases
thehazard of internal migration and shortens duration, but otheramenities do not matter.
Although geographical mobility is highly responsive to real wage differences, migration cannot be
expected to fully equalize real wage rates across internal labor markets because ofthe significant
fixed costs associated with long-distance internal migration and importance ofamenities at the
origin.
Key words: internal migration. United States, interstate moves, hazard function, fixed costs, local
amenities.
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Migration, Fixed Costs, and Location-Specific Amenities:
A Hazard Rate Analysis
by
Wallace E. Huffman and Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan'
I r 1 ''
Since Schultz' important paper on human capital (Schultz 1961), human migration has
been an important topic ofeconomic research. Much ofthe human capital literature on internal
migration has emphasized the expected net earnings benefit as themajorfactordriving human
migration decisions, e.g., seeSchwartz (1976), Schlottman andHerzog (1981), Herzog and
Schlottman (1984), Sandefur (1985), Pissarides ^d Wadsworth (1989), Bpijas,Bronars, and
Trejo (1992), Detang-Dessendre andMolho (1999). Muchlessemphasis has been givento the
fixed costs associated with migration and role of location-specific amenities (Greenwood 1997).
The objective of this paper is topresent a model of long-distance, migration for a finite-
life individual who consumes leisure, purchased goods, and local amenities and incurs significant
fixed costs ofmoving and .empirical results from ahazard rate analysis ofresidence
spells/internal migration using data on adult males in the Panel ofIncome Dynamics Study
(PSID) over a20 year period, The econometric results show astrong negative effect ofthe wage
difference between the home/origin location and host locations and offixed costs associated with
amove and apositive effect ofthe local crime rate on thehazard of internal migration. The story
unfolds in the following sections.
The authors are Professor, Department ofEconomics, Iowa State University, Ames, lA 50011, and ChiefEconomist,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jaka^, Indonesia. The authors thank Peter Orazem for helpful comments
and the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment"Station for financial 'assistance.
2The Conceptual Model of Internal Migration
An individual receives utility from leisure time, purchased goods, and local
amenities/disamenities. The latter is not a choice at the margin, but is an indicator of location-
specific culture and climatic, topographic (e.g., near seacoast, mountains, plains), and
environmental conditions that affect the translation of leisure and goods into satisfaction. An
individual considers staying in his home (h) areaor migrating to a host (f) area, and he is
uncertain about futurewage and amenity outcomes at these locations. Assume inter-temporal
separability utility function, risk neutral individuals, anddenote the expected indirect utility
function for each year asVj(Wjt, Xjt), where Wj is the expected real wage in location] and Xj is
expected local amenities in locationj,j=h,f (Greenwood1997,p. 668, 677). Let all expected
relocation costs associated with moving from h to f in t, except for the foregone earnings, be
represented by c^, and to simplify, assume that c^ is fixed and invariant with the distance moved.
Also for simplicity, assumethat local amenities and relocation costs can be measured in real
wage units.
The individual chooses his location so as to maximize the expected discounted reward.
Assume an n period planning horizon (i.e., length of remaining life), migrate in the first period,
and ignoring discounting (or the real discount rate is zero), then the individual will migrate if
n n
(1) E (w„+x ) < -c +E (w„+x ).
t=l t=2
D n
Clearly equation (1) implies that ^ +x^^) and
t=2 t=2
n _5_
S (^ht ~ ^ ~^hi) • Hence, the sum over remaining life ofthe difference in the
t=2 t»2
expected value of local amenities between the home and host location is less than the sum over
the remaining life of the difference in expected value of host and home real wage rates.
However, only if x^^) =0 can we say for certain that the average expected real wage
t=2
difference between the hostandhome location will bepositive. Forexample, if thehost^ea
gives unusually high expected local amenity value relative to the home area, itmay be lifetune
utility maximizing for the individual to migrate from h to f eyen when the average expected wage
difference aftermigration between thehost andhome areas is negative.
a
DefineD as an indicatorvariabletaking a value of I if (Wj^^ +Xj^j) <
t=i
n
(Wj^ +Xj^) and 0otherwise. Then the probability ofmigrating from h to f can
t=2
be represented as the following probability statement: • • . •
(2) Pr(D=l) = P,
(4)
E (Wh,+Xh.) < (Wfi+V
,t=l t=2
Thus, the following comparative static results hold:
(3) > 0 for j = f
_ /< 0 for j =h
" i>0 for j=f
dv/..
jt
ap^(D = 1)
3x.,
Jt
ap^(D = 1)(5) — i<0.
•fi5 c.
Hence, the probability ofmigrating from h tof is increasing inWf orXf, and decreasing inw^ or
1 I f -
Xh, other things equal. It is also decreasing inthe fixed cost ofmigration.
In a static environment, a strong economic incentive exists for a finite life individual to
migrate from h to f early, perhaps inthe first period, orto stay ath. However, given amoye
4from hto fis completed, it is possible for additional moves to be optimal, e.g. to return to the
home location.
The Empirical Model
At apoint in time, individuals are observed to have lived in their current area of residence
for various lengths oftime. In afree society, individuals are observed to occasionally move
internally to a new location and take up a new residence location. There are good reasons to
expect duration dependence in migration behavior. Individuals may form attachments to their
home area which grows over time. This will occur as they build local human capital in
knowledge oflocal shopping opportunities, restaurants, recreation, and schools, and social and
economic ties develop. However, economic conditions may change locally (determinate) or in a
potential host location (improve) and cause one tomove geographically ormigrate. As local
human capital accumulates with time living inan area and significant fixed cost ofmigrating
exist, we expect themigration hazard to rise as local employment opportunities are exhausted
relative to new developments in other locationbut then to decline (Greenwood 1997). Hence,
econometric methodsbasedon time-dependent hazard functions provideone natural approach for
an analysis of internal migration.
The Hazard Model
Define T as the duration or length of a completed residence spell in a location (home
area) with associated c.d.f ofF(t) and p.d.f of f(t) where t is a realization ofT. An individual's
hazard function for migration can be represented as the limiting probability that a residence spell
is completed in t, given that he has stayed in the home area until time t.
(6) H(t) P^(t<T£t+hlT>t)/h =f(t)/[l -F(t)] = f(t)/S(t)
5where H(t) is the individual's migration rate at t, and S(t) =P,Cr>t) is the individual's survival
amction for the home area. Hence, S(t) expresses the probability that aresidency spell is of
length at least t (Kiefer 1988; Lancaster 1990; Greene 2000, pp. 939).
In our model, we wish to test for effects ofaset ofexplanatory variables Xon the
migration hazard rate, i.e., aproportional hazard rate specification, and to consider possible
heterogeneity in the residency spells (individuals). Heterogeneity can arise as (i) individual-
specific unmeasured effects, e.g.. intensity ofpsychic costs ofmoving, (ii) measuremem error in
X, or (iii) measurement error in the duration ofaresidency spell. Ifwe impose the Weibull
distribution on residency duration (t) and let v, distributed as gamma with unit mean and
variance 6, represent the individual-specific unmeasured heterogeneity, the mixed resident
survivor function is
(7) S(t,X,p,o,0) ={l ^•e[texp(XP)]''}
The associated migration hazard function is:
1 (-)' —
(8) H(t,X,P,O,0) = [S(t,X.P,O,0)]® (i)t " [exp(Xp)]°.'
o
In particular, the effect of unmeasured resident heterogeneity is increasing in 0, but as 6 goes to
zero, heterogeneity vanishes.- If 0 is not significantly different from zero, the hazard for
migration is monotone in duration.
Some variables in X for the i-th individual, sayX|j, change overtime and arejointly
determined with duration. When this is the case, Xi,j is typically assigned its value at the
beginning of the residency spell, sayXyo, (Greene 2000, pp. 943, Lancaster 1990). Some other
variables change over time and are not endogenous to duration, e.g., an individual's age and
location-specific attributes.
The Data
The individuals in this study are adult males who were surveyed for the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID has major advantages over other micro-data sets in that
multiple moves can be distinguished and individual characteristics are known at the time of the
move and do not have to be approximated. Individuals were selected into the panel in 1968 or
added as new adult males because they either grew into adult males or joined the household of an
original 1968data panelist. Individuals who leave an original PSID household are followed and
re-interviewed for as long as they can be located. Every panel household member for our sample
was 19-45 years of age in 1968, followed from the year after he completed school to the time
when he retired, died, or was lost from the survey. Data for these individuals are supplemented
with data for their residence area.
Migration over longer distance is generally associated with changes in employment or
retirement; whereas short distance migration is frequently associated only with only a change in
housing. The latter is not of interest to us. Some important amenity/disamenity attributes of
areas (climate, crime, topography, environment, and public schools) and occupational licensing
are associated with major political jurisdictions. The most frequently used area grouping for the
United States is states, and other interstate migration studies include Pashigan (1979), Boijas,
Bronars, and Trejo (1992), Brinig and Buckley (1996), Sandefur (1985), Clark, Knapp, and
White (1996). Hence, for our study an individual is defined as a long-distance migrant if he
moves across a state boundary. We, however, are treating all inter-state moves the same, i.e., we
are not distinguishing between interstate moves that vary in distance from the home to the new
host location. This is consistent with our conceptual model where migration costs are dominated
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by fixed costs associated with maldrig adecision.to move, saying good-by and loading a family's
possessions atthe original location, and finding anew place to live, unpacking the family's
possessions, finding new shopping and business establishments, and making new fnends in the
host location.^
Also, since host locations andtheirlocation-specific amenities are a choice,"all potential
i I • • . I
migrants will be facing a similar common fixed amenity-effect of potential host locations.
Hence, giventhey live at different locations, the local amenity attributes that differ^ong them
is the amenity attributes of their home/origin location.
Using the PSID, the state ofresidence ofeach individual can be identified. We focus on
the period 1968 to 1987. Table 1 summarized the information on frequency of interstate moves
for thePSID participants. Among the 915^ individuals in thesample, 722 (78.9 percent) stayed
in the same state throughout the period. Among the 193 individuals who had at least one
interstate move, 97 (more than 50 percent) moved only once. The frequency of interstate movers
decreased as the number ofmoves increased. The full number ofPSID participating males 19 to
45 years of age in 1968 is 915 individuals, andwe deriveda total of 865 residence spells having
known starting dates for eachspell and 1,268 residence spells whenadjusted starting dates
replaced missing dates.'^ See Appendix A for details. Because young individuals haye stronger
incentives to move, young p^icipants, males who were 12-24 years of age in 1968, wereused to
derivea set of resident spells of youngpotential migrants.^
The Empirical Hazard Function
The symbols used to define the variables inthe empirical hazard rate model are presented
intable 2, and the systematic part of the hazard rate fimction is specified as:.
8(9) Xfe)p = p„+ p.W(hy + + p3AGE(y + P4AGE%,) + p^EDUftJ
+ pfiAVUNHRft,) + P^UNIONftJ+ pgDSLFEMPCy + p^MARRCy+ p,oCHILD(tJ
+ p„CRIME(y + PnPARKftJ + P.3JAN(0+ pHJULYftJ + p.^DWHITEft,)
where:
i =1,2,n, denotes individuals,
s =1,2,Cj, denotes the spells, and
Cj = maximum number of spells for individual i.
Expectations about the signs of the p's are as follows. A wage increaseat the
original/home location will reduce thehazard ofmigration and a wage increase at thehost
location will increase it. Although there is a stronger incentive for young males tomigrate than
older pre-retirement males, the hazard ofmigration maynot peakat the youngest age
(Greenwood 1997, pp. 655-6). Because finite life and the life cycle plays an important rolein the
timing ofhuman capital and other family decisions, the marginal effect of an individual's age
seems unlikely to be linear, andAGE^(tis) is also included as a regressor. Weexpect P3 > 0 and
P4<0.
The next seven variables are associated with the costs ofmigration. Apotential migrant's
education is expected tobe poshively related to the hazard rate for interstate migration (i.e., P5 >
0). An individual's education has been shown to beassociated with the ability to acquire, process,
and make efficient decisions (Huffman 1977; Schwartz 1976; Schultz 1975). A large amount of
uncertain is associated with moving to a new location, and additional education and information
cangreatly reduce it. Also, Detang-Dessendre andMolho (1999, 2000) have shown that an
individual's schooling increases his/her hazard of internal long distance migration. When a
potential migrant experiences unemployment, the opportunity cost ofhis time for searching for
•9
or/arranging new location employment options isireduced (Herzog and Schlottmann 1988;..
Pissarides andWadsworth 1989^ Goss andPaul 1990); andweexpect lus hazard ratefor ^
migrationto increaise (i.e:, p6 > 0). - ''
Being a union member, self-employed,dn a profession ortrade association, is associated
with non-transferable rights, revenue generatingxlients^or location-specific information largely
tiedto a potential migrant's current location (Goss and Paul 1990; Pashigian 1979). These •
attributes of his employment areexpected to.increase-a .potential migrant's utility at his current
location relative to a new location and to reduce.his.haz^d rate,for migration (i.e., p? and Pg < 0).
Having school age children and beingmarried'increases the psychological and monetary
costs ofmoving because of the larger number ofpersonal ties that must be broken, and greater
volume ofpersonal possessions and larger number of individuals to get' ready to move and to get
settled in a new-location (Mincer 1978; Greenwood 1997, pp. 701-705).-They tend to tie a •
potential migrant to his current location and reduce his expected gain from internal migration,
other things eqtial, e.g., P9 and Pio < 0.; - • r- . ..
Amenities/disamenities at a potentialmigrant's,currentlocation relative to potential host
locations are expected to affect,the hazard rateof internal migration (Greenwood 1997, pp. 616-
7). We focus on the crimerate, area in parks, andnormal Julyand January temperatures. A. .
higher area crime rate against persons and real property;provides a negative local public good to
residents (and others) by imposing psychic and self-protection costs onall'xesidents (and others)
and lowers theirutility, other things equal. Hence, weexpect a larger value of CRIME to
increase the hazard ofmigration, i.e., p,., > 0,ortoreduce residence duration. Incontrast,
resident area parks provide apositive local public good, and can beexpect to reduce the hazard
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for migration (i.e., Pn <0). January and July temperatures play an important role in determining
the types ofwinter and summer season outdoor recreational opportunities that are in an area (and
winter heating and summer cooling costs). Ifthese weather variables are not fully reflected in
real wage rates, then pn and p,4will be statistically significant.
Whites are expected tohave ahigher hazard rate for migration than nonwhites (i.e., p,5 >
0). Filler (1992) has shown that whites inthe United States have many geographical locations
where they can potentially move to and approximately maintain their well being relative tothe
opportunities available to nonwhites. His finding suggests whites will experience shorter
duration at a location than nonwhites, other things equal.
The Wage at Host Locations
An individual's expected real wage at potential host locations is an important variable in
thehazard ofmigration analysis, but it is not directly observable. If weassume that the U.S.
labor market ftmctions relatively well in valuing heterogeneous attributes ofworkers, locations,
andjobs, a well specified hedonic wage equation may provide useful information aboutthe
expected wage in potential host locations (Roback 1988,1982; Rosen 1986; Topel 1986; Tokle
andHuffman 1991; Kenny and Denslow 1980; Hoch and Drake 1974). In particular, state units
provide valuable variation for identifying the parameters of awage or individual labor demand
equation. Consider the following hedonic hourly real wage equation for an individual:
(10) Cn(W;^,)=^ p,X; + pA + PA + Ei
where
Wjj; = thenominal hourly wage of individual i living in state k,
11
Pj. =price index for purchased inputs used to produce indirect utility in
households of individuals livmg in state k,
Xj = personal characteristics,
Zjt = state characteristics which affect labor productivity,
Ak = hedonic stateamenity/disamenity attributes,
6; = random disturbance representing luck, E(ei) = 0,
px = return to'personal characteristics,,
p2 = returnto localproductivity characteristics,'
Pa = returnto hedonic localattributes.
When markets work well, the prices of traded goods are approximately the same across
states, adjusted for transport costs. Theprices of nontraded goods, e.g., localamenities, seem
likelyto differ across states.- State cost of living indexes do not exist, but assumethat the
following linear state consumer cost of living index provides a good approximation:
(11) to(Pk) = a,to(P) + (1 - ai)to(PLANDk) + ttjUMANk
+ asCLIMATEk + a^REGIONk + 6^
' = Cn(P) + (l-a,)[MPLANDfeHn(P)] + a2URBANk . *
+ ajCUMATEk + a4REGI0Nk + 6k
where
P = national price index for variable goods and services purchased by
households,
PLANDk - nominal price of land (proxy for home-site values) in state k, '
URBANk = percentage urban population in state k (congestion index),
CLIMATE^ = climatic characteristics of state k,
REGION^ = regional dummy variables, and,
6k = randomdisturbance, £(6^)= 0.
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Substituting equation (11) into equation (10), obtain the following wage equation;
(12) «n(Wi^) = + PA + + (1 - a,)[«n(PLAND^yP)] + a^URBAN,
+ ttaCLIMATEk + a4REGI0Ni;+ £; + 6k
By incorporating PLAND, URBAN, CLIMATE, and REGION, which control for "unpriced"
local attributes in the nationalconsumer cost of living index, into equation (12), the p^'s, p^'s,
and Pa'scan be interpreted as the average U.S. real price/value of an attribute.'^ More importantly
for this study, we expect to obtain better predictions of the real wage at host locations.
The complete empirical specification of the real hourly wage equation is:
(13) Cn(Wjky/Py) = a + ttjEDUiy + ajEXPjy +ajEXPjy^ + a4RACEi + {n(PLANDky/Py)
+ ttfiURBANi^y + ttyCRIMEi^y + agJANk + agJULY^ + aiQpJOBGRky
+ oC]]PURATEky + oti2RSHOCKky + 0£i3RURATEky + ai4DSjy + otisDWjy +
aifiDNCjy +a,7TIMEy + aigTIMEy^ + ejy
where the local labor market variables follow closely Topel's (1986) and Adams' (1985)
definitions (See Appendix B for details). TIME and TIME squared are included to allow for a
possible long term negative trend in male real wage rates (Mishel and Bernstein 1993, pp. 142).
All variables are defined in table 3.
The Empirical Results
Using the PSID and supplemental data on attributes of states, empirical resuhs are
reported for the hedonic wage equation and for the hazard of internal migration.
The Wage Equation
The wage equation (equation 13) is fitted to all the observations for the 915 PSID
individuals pooled over 20 years (1968-87). The performance of the fitted wage equation is
generally in agreement with results reported in other studies. A one-year increase in an
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individual's schooling increasedhis realwage by about 7.5 percent. An increase in his
experience hasa positive effect on his real wage butat a diminishing marginal rate. The
maximum effectof EXP occurs at 26 years of experience (approximately 45 years of age). All
other measured variables held equal, white males earn 11 percentmore relative to nonwhites.
These results are consistent with those reported byNeal and Johnson (1996) and smaller than by
Topd(1986).
Wage rates also differ because of local cost of living and amenity differences. Both the
real price of land (PLAND/P) and congestion as reflected in URBAN have positive effects on
the real wage rate. The elasticity of the wage with respect to the land price is about 0.05. A one
percentage point increase in the proportion ofa state's population that is urban increases the real
wage by about 30 percent. The land price effecton the wage comparesfavorable to the findings
ofKenny and Denslow(1980) and Tokle and Huffman (1991) but the effects of URBAN is
larger in this study.
Local amenities have significant affects on the real wage. A one percentage point increase
ina state's crime rate increases the real wage byabout 1.5 percent (significant at the 1percent
level), which is consistent with finding reported by Roback (1982, 1988). Ahigher average
January or July temperature for anarea reduces the real wage by 4 percent or 17 percent per
10 degree increase, respectively, suggesting positive amenity value or reduced labor demand,
other things equal, including Census Region. Hence, the effects ofaverage January and July
temperatures are not fully captured by other variables.
State labor market characteristics have a significant effect on individuals' wage rates. A
one percentage point increase in the predicted state job growth rate (PJOBGR) increases the real
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wage by 6.0 percent, and a one percentage point increase in the predicted state unemployment
(PURATE) rate increases the real wage by 4.3 percent. The latter result is greater by a factor
of three than those obtained byTopel (1986) andTokle andHuffman (1991). The signsof the
coefficients for both RSHOCK and RURATE, which are unanticipated outcomes, are consistent
with the results in Topel (1986) and Tokle and Huffman (1991).
Historically the U.S. has had some broad regional differences in real wage rates, and our
results show that these have not gone away, even after controlling for land prices, urbanization,
crime rates, and climate. Compared to the Northeastern region, the real male wage rate in the
South is 8.9 percent lowerand 13.7 percent lowerin the West. However, the male realwage rate
in the North Central region is not significantlydifferent from those in the Northeast region.
Consistent with other evidence, the results show a statistically significant negative trend in the
male real wage rate of slightly less than I percent per year.
The Hazard of Migration
The empirical hazard function for migration is fitted to the data on residence spells using
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure (see Greene 2000; Kiefer 1988; Lancaster 1990).
In fitting the model, we have combined the information on real wage at the home/original
location with that of the potential host locations to defineAW as the averageannual difference
between the log actual wage at the home locationand predicted log wage for host locations over
a residence spell.' Six sets ofestimates are reported in table 4 and two sets of marginal effects are
reported in table 5. The results in columns (3) and (5) show that the pure-Weibull shape
parameter o is significantly different from one (t valueof 5.45)and the heterogeneity parameter
0 is significantly positive. Furthermore, these results imply that the hazard of migration is
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concave in residence duration. For the full sample, the maximum hazard rate for internal
migration occurs whenan individual has beenin^place for 6 years (see figure 2).
We focus on the results in column(5), the full sample;of residencejspells, and in column
(6), the residence spellsof young potential migrants. In.general; the results are strongly
supportive of the hypothesis that realwage differences,' lengthof remaining life, local amenities,
and costs of migrationare importantdeterminants^of the hazardof male internalmigration. The
estimated coefficient ofAWis negative and significantly different-from zero at the 1 percent
level. For the full-sample, a one.percent increase in the actual real male wage;at the home/origin
location, one percent decrease ofthe predicted real.malewage at host locations; or one percent •
increase in the difference between the two real /Wage-rates decreases his hazard of internal •
migration by 82 percent. For the young sample, thc'responsiveness is higher, a 158percent-
decrease. . .
The effects ofAGE.and AGE-squared are significantly different from zero in the
migration hazard equations for the full sample andyoung sample. In the full sample, which is not
undulyconstrainedby age, the results imply that themarginal effectofa male's AGE on the
hazard of internal migration-is positive up,to 42 years of age,^but.then.it declines for additional
years of age. The hazard of internalmigration is,affected ;by the expected costsof migration. A
male who has more schooling has; a higher hazard-rate for intemalmigration;:For the fiill sample,
- a one-year increase ina potential migrant's education increases his hazard ofinternal migration
by 6.6 percent (24 percentfor the young-male sample). These resuhs suppoit the findings of-
Detang-Dessendre and Molho (1999,2000). Apotential migrant who has experienced
unemployment athis home/origin ismore likely to move. For the whole sample, the coefficient
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of UNEMP is, however, significantly different from zero only at the 7 percent level, but it is
significant at the onepercentlevel for the young sample.
Union membership and self^employment reduce a potential migrant's hazard for
interstatemigration. The estimated coefficient of self-employment is significantly different from
zero at the 1 percent level, but for UNION at only the 9 percent level (full sample). The marginal
effect of a male being self-employed (or a farmer) is to reduce his hazard for interstate migration
by 179 percent for the full sample and by an even larger amount in the young sample. Being
married and having school age children reduces significantly the hazard of internal migration in
the full sample. Being married (for the whole time in a residence spell) causes a dramatic
reduction in the male's hazard of internal migration, by 194 percent, and an additional school age
child reduces the migration hazard by 22 percent. As expected, the effects of being married is
smaller and weaker statistically in the young-male sample.
When interpreting the effects of local amenities on the hazard of internal migration, it is
important to recall that the real wage rates at the home and host locations have been adjusted for
the market's valuation of these attributes. Hence, the remaining direct effects on the migration
hazard rate of local amenities is capturing effects that are not fully reflected in real wage rates.
The crime rate at the home location/origin has a positive and significant effect at the 1 percent
level on the migration hazard rate in the full sample. The marginal effect of a one percentage
point increase in CRIME is to increase the hazard for internal migration by 7 percent. However,
the direct effect ofPARK, JAN, and JULY on the hazard of internal migration is not statistically
significant, suggesting that these local amenities are adequately reflected in spatial real wage
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differences. The young male sample, however, is also less sensitive to CRIME than the full. <
sample.
As expected, a white male has a significantly higher hazard rate for internal migration
thanfor a nonwhite male. In the'full sample,'the hazard ofmigration is 77 percent higher.^
Conclusion
This paper has presented an analysis of human long-distance internal migration for adult
males. For a finite-life-utility m^iiiiizing individual, we showed that an increase in the expected
home/origin area wage, value of local amenities there, or fixed costs associated with moving to a
host location decrease the probability of internalmigration. Similarly, an increase in the
expected realwage of host locations orvalue of local amenities there increase theprobability of
internal migration.
The empirical resultswere obtained using^data on adultmales in the PSID over the
20 year period 1968 to 1987.- Inthe first part, we showed that the local deflated land price and
amenities reflected incongestion, crime rate, and average January and July temperatures have
significant effects ontheexpected real male wage rate. Human capital variables and state labor
market conditions were also shown to be important determinants ofthe male wage.
In the second part, the migrationhazardfor adultmales,was shown to be concave in
residence duration, with the hazard oflong-distance internal migration peaking after six years in
residence. A larger positive real wage difference between thehome andhost locations was
shown to lower the migration hazard, and the migration hazard was shown tobeconcave ina
potential migrant's age. Variables that proxy fixed costs of internal migration, e.g., having less
education, being married, having children in school, being self-employed or aunion member.
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were shown to significantly lower thehazard of internal migration andto increases duration at
the home location or origin.
The local crime rate is a disamenity-anegative local public goodwhich imposespsychic
and self-protection costs onall residents. Anincrease in thecrime rate at thehome/origin area
increases the hazard of internal migration and shortens duration. However, other local amenity
variables, e.g., area in parks, average January and July temperatures, were shown to have no
significant effect on the hazard ofmigration, suggesting that real wage rates accurately
compensate for these amenities. Overall, strong support is found for fixed costs and local
amenities at the origin in long-distance internalmigrationdecisions ofadult males.
The empirical results implymovement across internal labormarkets is responsive to real
wage differences. However, our results also imply that fixed costsassociated withmigration and
local amenities, e.g., a low crime rate at the origin, are a major drag on internal migration.
Becauseof significant fixed costs associatedwith long distance internal migration and
importance of local amenities at the origin, migration cannot beexpected to fully equalized real
wage rates across internal labor markets.
migration,ms\iubag^/.wpd
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APPENDIX A: Treatment of Censored Spells
Fora time-dependent hazard model, estimation requires that every spell becompleted or
right-censored. In this study, the existence of left-censored spells, however, is unavoidable
because all individuals resided in a state for some time prior to the start of the survey in 1968.
However, the PSID does not have informationabout how long participants lived in a state before
1968. Because there is no standard procedure for dealing with the issue of left-censoring, this
study presents three empirical strategies, or treatments, to close some of the spells. Each
treatment has its advantages and disadvantages.
For the first treatment, we selected only completed and right-censored spells that started
in 1968. In other words, we ignore the spells starting before 1968. This selection led to 207
completed and 184 right-censored spells. The advantageof this treatment is that all information
for estimating the hazard rate, namely, the diu-ation and explanatory variables, are readily
observable. The problem, however, is nonrandom selection.
For the second treatment, we tried to utilize all completed and right-censored spells,
including those starting before 1968. To proceed, assume that those residing in 1968 in the same
state where they grew up had lived in that state continuously before 1968. This assumption
means that the starting time for the spell is the year when the individual turned age 19. When an
individual moved before 1968 from the state where he grew up, the starting time of the first spell
and thus the duration of the spell remained unknown. In this second treatment, we do not include
these unobservable spells in the sample used for estimation. The second treatment has 284
completed and 581 right-censored spells. The 284 completed spells consist of207 spells starting
in 1968or after, and 77 spells starting before 1968. Comparedto the first treatment, the number
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ofcompleted spells increased significantly with the .second.treatment, and theproblem of .,
nonrandom selection associated with the firsttreatment is reduced. .
For the third treatment,we predictedthe starting:time-for 1jie left- censored.residence
spells and then used all spells.in fitting the time-dependent hazard fimction. The starting date is
unknown for some spells because,prior to 1968, s(3me;individuals hadmigrated from-the state
where they grewup. In otherwords, the starting date>for some first spells were observed and
some were not. When data.are censored, we can apply Heckman's procedure to predict the
unobserved starting date for. those first spells (Heckman 1980). The idea ofHeckman's
procedure is to predict the unobserved length of spells based on the observed group, adjusted to
the sample selectivity. The selection criteria is the migration which took place before 1968.
There are 874 spells starting before 1968 in the sample. Among them, 585 are right-
censored and 289 are right-closed spells. In the right- censored group, the starting time for 127
spells is unknown. Thus, 127 spells are both right- and left-censored. In the right-closed group,
the startingtime of 138out of289 spells is unknown. These 138 spells are left-censored but
right-closed. Therefore, 265 potentially unknown spells out of the total 1,268 are to be
predicted/estimated. Because the right-closed and theright-censored spells came from different
populations, weapplied Heckman's procedure twice, first for thegroup of right-closed spells and
second for thegroup of right-censored spells. Note that theright-censored first spells are derived
from individuals who never moved until theend of theperiod of observation.
Aproblem remains, however, because some ofthe explanatory variables, especially the
wage rates, were not observed before 1968. The best information available is the value of
explanatory variables in the first spell derivedfrom the data in 1968or earlier. The use of
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partially observed explanatory variables for some spells that started before 1968 couldlead to
measurement error problems. To reducethemeasurement errorproblem,we will fit themodel
twice. First, we used the spells derived from all individuals in the sample. Second, we selected
onlyindividuals whowere 19to 24years of age in 1968. It is important to note that spells can
not start until the individual is 19 years old. When the young male sample is used in the
analysis, the starting time of the first spell couldgo back as far as 1963. This approach decreases
the number of partiallyobserved spells and reduces measurement error problemswithoutcausing
nonrandom selection error, and leads to 137 completed arid 141 right-censored spells.
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APPENDIX B: Definition ofLabor Market Conditions
Predicted job growthin statek in yeary (PJOBGRj^) is the difference between the
forecasted value of the natural logarithm ofthe state's private sector employment in years y and
y-1. The forecasts:were obtained from a regression of the natural logarithm ofnon-agricultural
employment for 1968-91 ona quadratic trend. The residuals from these regressions, e^y, are
indexes oftime varying local deinandconditions iii state k in year y. Next, the natural logarithm
of national (U.S.) aggregateemployment was regressed on a quadratictrend. The residual from
this regression, Cy, captures theaggregate labor demand disturbance in year y. The relative local
labor disturbance ofstate kui year y (RSHOCKky) isdefmed as RSHOCKj-y = e,jy - e^. This
variable expresses the current labor demand shock as a deviation from the aggregate labor
demand shock.
The predicted state unemployment rate in state k in year y(PURATEky) measures the
anticipated state equilibrium unemployment rate. This rate isobtained by'regressing the state's
annual unemployment rate for 1968-91 on aquadratic trend. The unanticipated unemployment
rate is captured by the residual unemployment rate (RURATEky).
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ENDNOTES
1. The hazard function H(t) is obtained from the survival function as H(t) = - dlnS(t)/dt; so there
is a sign reversal of coefficients in going between the survival and hazard functions. The Weibull
distribution is monotone (constant, increasing, or decreasing) in duration, but employment duration
is generally non-monotonic concave in duration (Lancaster 1990,pp. 9; Gritz 1993). We permit this
patternin residence durationby adopting amixture distribution-Weibull and gamma. An alternative
distributionwith this pattern is log-logistic (Keifer 1988;Lancaster 1990; Greene 2000, pp. 940-41).
All are distributions for a nonnegative random variable.
2. Heterogeneity wdll arise when a population of residents (residence spells) has potentially
different distributions of duration after controlling for the effects of observable variables. The
gamma distribution is frequently used for representing the distribution of v associated with this
unobserved heterogeneity. Chamberlain (1985) and Heckman and Singer (1985) have shown that
failure to include heterogeneity when it is present causes significant bias in the estimated coefficients
of the regressors in the hazard function. Han and Hausman (1990) have shown that a parametric
gamma distribution ofunobserved heterogeneity leads easily to estimable models and is not unduly
restrictive.
3. Boijas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) make the opposite assumption that migration costs are
dominated by variable costs associated with the distance moved. This assumption seems most
applicable to never married, young individuals, and their empirical results are for the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (waves 1979-1986).
4. Among 915 individuals in the PSID in 1968,56 (6.12 percent) died, 144 (15.74 percent) were
lost, and 132 (14.4 percent) retired during 1968-87. Individuals who refused to participate in the
survey at any time during 1968-87 were deleted from the sample. Individuals who were classified
as 'lost' consist of those who joined the army (30.5 percent), and those who moved out from the
United States and/or were really lost (69.5 percent).
5. These males were 38 to 43 years of age in 1987.
6. REGION also controls for regional differences in the wage structure in the United States
(e.g., see Roback 1988).
7. Somepositiveattributesof AWare as follows. Fkst, thewagedifferences represents luck,which
can explain why two persons having the samemeasured attributes may have different wage rates.
Second, the wagedifferencecaptures the unmeasured state-specific returns to factors affecting wage
rates, whichmight differ from the average return across the United States. Third, the wage difference
incorporatestenure effects due to firm- or location-specifichuman capital associated with the current
residence.
Table 1. The distribution of the number of interstate moves by males,
1968-87
Number
of move
Frequency
1
• Percent Frequency
(Cumulative)
Percent
0 722 78.9 722 78 .9
1 97 10.6 819 89.5
2 59 6.4 878 96.0
3 23 2.5 - " 901 98 .5
4 9 1.0 910 • 99.5
5 3 0.3 913 99.8
6 2 0.2 915 100.0
Source: PSID files
Table 2. Variable names and sample means for the hazard function
Symbol Variable Description
Sample Means
Completed Censored
Spells Spells
W(hti8) The average real hourly wage in the
home location or origin over the residence
spell
W(ftis) The average real hourly predicted wage
for potential host locations over the
residence spell
AW(tig) The average percentage annual differences
between actual and predicted wage in
residence spell (see text) -0.199 -0.161
AGE(tis) Age at the beginning of the spell (year) 34.473 34.341
EDU(tie) Level of education at the beginning of 14.043 12.544
the spell
AVUNHR(ti9) Average annual unemployment hours in the 70.474 42.855
spell (hr/year)
UNION(tie) Dummy variable, equals to 1 if an 0.135 0.258
individual is a union member at the
beginning of the spell, or 0 otherwise
DSLFEMP(ti8) Dummy variable, equal to 1 if self- 0.150 0.315
employed or a farmer and 0 otherwise
MARR(ti3) Share of time being married in a 0.713 0.796
residence spell
CHILD (tia) Number of children who are school age 0.766 1.305
at the beginning of a spell
CRIME(tis) Average annual crime rate in the state 0.195 -0.472
corresponding to residence spell,
relative to the U.S. average
PARK(tie) Share of state area in state and national -0.116 -0.050
parks corresponding to residence
spell, relative to U.S. average
JAN(tie) Average (over 30 years) January 4.781 1.563
temperature .corresponding to residence
spell, relative to the U.S. average
JULY(ti8) Average (over 30 years)July temperature 1.382 0.138
corresponding to residence spell,
relative to the U.S. average
RACE(tis) Dummy variable, equal to 1 if white and 0.986 0.921
0 otherwise
Number of spells 207 1,061
Table 3. Variable names, sample means, and the coefficient in the wage
equation (t-values are in parentheses)
Symbol
Waae eauation
Variable Description
Sample
mean coefficient t-values
Dependent variable:
•-
(n(Wiy/Py) Log of real hourly wage- •
of individual i .in. ....
year y (Cn $/hr)® 2.431 -
Personal characteristics;
EDUiy Education of individual i
in year y (in years) • • ^
12 .709 0.075 ( 34.07)
EXPiy Experience of individual i f
in year y (Age-EDU-6 in yrs) 23.597 0.051 ( 21.83)
EXPiy= Experience squared/100 t 6.581 -0.098 (-19.62)
RACEi Dummy variable, equal to 1
if individual i is white
and 0 otherwise 0.929
Cost of living and amenities;
to (PIiAND)ty/Py) Log of real price of land in
URBANky
CRIMEky
JANv
JULY,
State k where individual
lives in year y ($/acres!
Proportion of urban
population in state k
in year y (percent)
Crime rate in state k ' * "
in year y ,(percent)
Thirty-year average of
January temperature in
state k (degrees F.)
Thirty-year average of
July temperature in
state k (degrees F.)
1,118.55
71.771.
8.090
33.167
75.648
State labor market
PJOBGR
PURATEky
RSHOCKfcy
Predicted job growth in state k
between years y and y-1 (see 0.213
Appendix B)
Predicted unemployment rate in
state k in year y (see Appendix 6.357
B)
Relative employment shock in
state k in year y (see Appendix 0.000
B)
0.110 ( 4.73)
0.048 ( 3.07)
0.295 ( 4.10)
0.015 ( 5.94)
-0.004 .( -3.39)
-0.017 (-10.42)
0.060 ( 7.46)
0.043 ( 7.15)
0.009 ( 2.92)
Table 3. (continued)
Symbol
RURATEjq,
Variable Description
Residual unemployment rate in
state k in year y (see Appendix
B)
Regional dummies and Trend;
DSly
DWly
DNCiy
TIME.
TIME.
Dummy variable equals 1 if
individual i lives in the
South and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 if
individual i lives in the
West and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 if
individual i lives in the
North Central region and
0 otherwise
Time indicator,
1968 =1, ..., 1987 = 20
Time squared/100
Number of observations
Sample Wacre equation
mean coefficient t-values
0.040 -0.005 ( -1.06)
0.290
0.226
0.272
10.123
1.357
15,367
-0.089 ( -3.03)
-0.137 ( -4.47)
-0.018 ( -0.92)
-0.012 ( -1.88)
0.008 ( -0.29)
®Py = Implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditure (1987
= 1.00)
^From the 915 individuals observed over 20 years, we derived 15,367
observations.
Table 4. Estimated hazard functions for internal migration
(t-values are in parenthesis)
Variables Constant Hazard
Rate
Full
(1)
Sample
(2)
Time Dependent Hazard Rate
Treatment 2
Full®
Sample
(3)
Young''
Sample
(4)
Treatment 3
Full®
Sample
(5)
Young''
Sample
(6)
INTERCEPT -3.575
C -3.47 )
-3.990
( -2.09 )
-6.614
( -7.85 )
-7.394
( -2.97 )
-6.634
(-11.47 )
-3.935
( -2.11 )
AW -0.215
( -2.40 )
-0.286
C -1.71 )
-0.603
{ -5.05 )
-0.420
( -2.53 )
-0.549
( -6.76 )
-0.499
( -3.76 )
AGE -0.180
( -4.16 )
-0.199
( -2.13 )
' 0.271
( 5.80 )
0.505
( 2.40 )
0.274
( 8.41 )
0.164
( 1.07 )
AGE^ /lOO 0.269
( 4.97 )
0.308
( 2.49 )
-0.323
( -4.80 )•
-0.926
( -2.27 )
-0.330
( -7.14 )
-0.304
( -1.05 )
EDU 0.135
( 5.93 )
0.212
( 4.90 )
0.048
( 1.72 )
-0.005
( -0.11 )
0 . 044
( 2.38 )
0.077
( 2.10 )
UNEMP 0.001
( 4.91 )
0.002
( 2.16 )
0.001
( 1.12 )
0.002
( 1.59 )
0.001
( 1.71 )
0.002
( 3.98 )
UNION -0.507
C -2.31 )
-0.760
( -2.50 )
-0.170
( -0.99 )
0.170
{ 0.81 )
-0.219
( -1.67 )
-0.257
( -1.23 )
DSLFEMP -1.344
( -7.03 )
-1.744
( -5.99 )
-1.229
( -7.21 )
-1.460
( -6.44 )
-1.191
( -9.33 )
-1.664
( -8.53 )
MARR -1.139
( -7.30 )
-1.240
( -3.78 )
-1.299
( -5.07 )
-0.251
( -0.68 )
-1.294
( -7.33 )
-0.328
( -1.28 )
CHILD -0.139
( -2.32 )
-0.167
( -2.12 )
-0.194
( -4.27 )
0.331
(• 1.56 )
-0.150
( -4.57 )
0.155
( 1.09 )
CRIME 0.002
C 0.11 )
0.052
( 1.59 )
0.056
( 2.01 )
0.008
( 0.19 )
0.046
( 2.47 )
0.052
( 1.55 )
PARK -0.060
( -1.57 )
-0.039
( -0.74 )
-0.085
( -1.46 )
-0.069
( -0.90 )
-0.028
( -0.86 )
0.000
( 0.00 )
JAN 0.024
C 3.41 )
0.020
( 1.82 )
-0.002
( -0.23 )
-0.005
( -0.37 )
-0.005
( -0.81 )
-0.005
( -0.55 )
JULY 0.015
( 1.28 )
0.022
( 1.12 )
0.001
( 0.05 )
0.019
( 0.71 )
0.006
( 0.55 )
0.006
( 0.35 )
RACE 1.693
( 2.98 )
2.073
( 3.17 )
0.633
( 1.55 )
0.532
( 1.01 )
0.512
( 2.07 )
0.142
( 0.30 )
CT • 0.632
( 7.97 )
0.184
( 2.62 )
0.667
( 10.91 )
0.315
( 4.39 )
e 3.814
( 4.47 )
3.843
( 3.83)
16.750
( 2.29 )•
2.644
( 4.78 )
7.166
( 3.29 )
Log-likelihood -793.5 -755.9 -795.0 -316.3 -1 ,287.2 -417.6
Completed Spells 207 207 284 137 496 191
Total Spells 1 ,268 1,268 865 278 1 ,268 350
(Table 4 continued)
®Full sample consists of males 19-45 years old in 1968, observed for 20
years (1968-87)
''Young sample consists of males 19-24 years old in 1968, observed for 20
years (1968-87).
Table 5. Marginal effect of selected explanatory variables on the hazard
rate for interstate migration
"Time-dependent Hazard Rate
Treatment 3
Explanatory
Variable Unit
Full sample
~ (From Table 5/"
Column 5)
Young sample
(From Table 5,
Column 6)
AW percent ' -0.823 -1.584
AGE (0 - 1)^ 0.947 _
EDU Year 0.066 "0.244
UNEMP hour 0.001 0.006
UNION Dummy:0,I -0.328 -0.816
DSLFARM Dummy:0,1 -1.786 -5.283
MARK (0 - 1) -1.940 ' -1.043
CHILD 0, 1, 2, ... -0.225 0.492
CRIME percent'' 0.069 0.165
RACE Dummy;0,1 0.768 0.451
®The share of time being in the twenties is used to calculate the
marginal effect of age
'Measured relative to U.S. average
1-16-01
1968
Figure 1.
36 ( 3.9 %) 232 (25.4 %)
5 ( 0.5 %) 100 (10.9 %)
874 (96.6 %) 583 (63.7 %)
1987
Distributions of starting and ending times of
observations for the 915 males in the sample.
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Figure 2. Predicted hazard rate and the duration of stay in the time-
dependent hazard model, using treatment 3 for the full sartple,
